Globalna strategia UE – koniec Unii Europejskiej jako potęgi normatywnej?

Streszczenie

Artykuł bada zgodność globalnej strategii UE z koncepcją Unii jako potęgi normatywnej. Istnieją obawy, że postawienie interesów przed wartościami może doprowadzić do utraty przez UE moralnej atrakcyjności. Wprowadzona zasada pryncypialnego pragmatyzmu, która ma na celu umocnienie odporności państw, może skutkować odejściem od promowania demokracji jako celu polityki zagranicznej. Porównanie globalnej strategii z komunikatem ze szczytu NATO w Warszawie wskazuje, że Sojusz Północnoatlantycki nabiera cech potęgi normatywnej, wcześniej utożsamianych z Unią Europejską.

Słowa kluczowe: *globalna strategia Unii Europejskiej, potęga normatywna, polityka sąsiedztwa, NATO*

Abstract

The article studies the consistency of the global strategy for the EU with the concept of the Union as a normative power. There are concerns, that putting interests above values could compromise the EU's moral attractiveness. Introduction of "principled pragmatism" as a way of enhancing the resilience of states could question the promotion of democracy as an aim of foreign policy. The comparison of EU global strategy with the NATO Warsaw summit communiqué suggest the latter organisation acquires the features of normative power hitherto associated with the European Union.

Key words: *European Union global strategy, normative power, neighbourhood policy, NATO*

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Global strategy for the EU – the end of the EU as a normative power?

On 29 June 2016, the European Union announced a global strategy in the field of foreign and security policy. A new principle guiding the foreign policy of the EU is to be principled pragmatism while its purpose is aimed at strengthening the resilience of countries in order to better resist crises. The EU expresses its readiness to cooperate with authoritarian countries and democratisation as a foreign policy objective becomes secondary.

The question is to what extent the global strategy is consistent with the idea of the European Union as normative power. In order to answer it, the first part will present the concept of normative power. The second part will discuss the global strategy for the EU in terms of the perception of security threats and ways to counter them and comply with the professed values. The third part will compare the global strategy of the EU with the decisions of the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 in terms of compliance with the provisions of the normative power.

The EU as a normative power

The concept of the EU as a normative power implies an ethical foreign policy, which aims to strengthen international law, democratic institutions and the international community. Normative policy relates to the determination of what is "normal" or what is "good". It can mean the standardisation of norms relating to international relations and the expectations of the consistent behaviour (Manners 2002a: p. 252). Normative policy is based on values such as pluralism, rule of law, democracy, the

market economy, dialogue and consensus. The policy towards the external environment consists of cooperation, transfer of values and management methods, in other words, a civilisational mission (Andreatta 2011: p. 38–40; see more in: Sjursen 2015; Jørgensen 2006). The opposite policy would be the policy aiming at the realisation of its own interests and turning a blind eye to violations of democratic standards, international law and human rights.

The European Union affects the international system by economic, political and cultural means, it creates a model to follow and attracts neighbours thanks to its attractiveness. Normative power is therefore consistent with the concept of soft power, which consists of the attractiveness of culture, law, diplomacy and appeal to higher values, as opposed to hard power, which uses military force (Nye 2007).

The impact of the European Union on the external environment is the result of the historical context, especially the heritage of two world wars, the importance of the political community represented by the EU institutions and the political and legal constitutionalism deriving from its legal and treaty nature. In external relations, the European Union aims to introduce democratic standards in its immediate vicinity (Manners 2002b).

In terms of the standard and non-standard targets and the standard and non-standard measures, researchers distinguish different types of foreign policy. Normative policy bases on the values and the action is taken in accordance with the logic of appropriateness, that is when it is deemed advisable. Non-normative is policy based on interests and the action is taken in accordance with the logic of consequences, that is when it is considered beneficial. In turn, the normative standard aims to strengthen international law, democracy and human rights whereas non-normative goals are the realisation of self-interest. Normative measures differ from non-normative ones by the rejection of violence, coercion and blackmail. According to these criteria, we can distinguish normative policy, the policy of status quo, imperial policy and Realpolitik (see Table 1).

Table 1. Types of foreign policy

		Measures	
		Normative	Non-normative
Objectives	Normative	Normative policy	Imperial policy
	Non-normative	Policy of status quo	Realpolitik

Source: Tocci 2008: 12.

The normative foreign policy pursues normative goals through normative measures. Imperial policy also performs normative goals, but by means such as coercion, structural violence or military power. The aim of the policy of status quo is not promoting democracy, but realising interests through normative measures. Realpolitik consists of the implementation of non-normative objectives with measures contrary to international law (Tocci 2008: p. 12).

Critics of the concept of the EU as a normative power realistically indicate that it is the synonym of political and military weakness. The European Union took on the role of a normative power because there is no other possibility of influence. There is a reversal of concepts: relying solely on the soft strength due to lack of coercive measures is presented as an advantage. The European Union is an instrument in the hands of the large Member States, enabling collective exercise of hegemony and the formation of neighbourhood according to their interest. (Hyde-Price 2006: p. 217, 226–227; 2008: p. 29). Critics of liberal positions indicate a discrepancy between normative declarations and practice involving the domination of the EU policy by the interests of large countries and private actors. The European Union does not normatively influence strong states, while weaker states are still treated paternalistically (Tilley 2012: p. 458–464). From the perspective of critical theory, the concept of normative power is an instrument of domination over the neighbourhood of the European Union (Merlingen 2007).

The global strategy of the European Union

The first EU strategic document in the field of foreign policy was the European Security Strategy of 2003. It assumed optimistically, in consistence with the concept of the EU as a normative power, that cooperation between the countries will replace confrontation, soft power will replace hard power and European values will become universal. The idea of effective multilateralism was to be the answer to the previous US strategy (see more: Biscop 2005). The European Security Strategy however was not rooted in the EU institutions and programs of action and its impact on the international environment turned out to be small.

In 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy was created, it aimed at promoting democracy, good governance, market economy, rule of law and sustainable development. The conditionality policy would ensure compliance of the economic and political development of partners with the values professed by the Union. In 2008 and 2009, the Eu-

ropean Neighbourhood Policy was divided into the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean (Ghazaryan 2016: p. 11; Poli 2016: p. 33).

The Global Strategy for the European Union of 29 June 2016 is the result of the work of the High Representative Federica Mogherini (see: Tocci 2015). The strategy was "welcomed" by the European Council without discussion. The media paid attention at the time to the referendum on the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Lehne 2016). The EU today is more modest, more aware of its limitations, does not overestimate its transformational strength, will increasingly be guided by the principles of a realistic policy and oriented to promote the interests of citizens.

The European Union departs from the provisions of the European Security Strategy of 2003. A holistic approach to the neighbourhood as a coherent space around the European Union has been replaced by a differentiated approach responding to the needs of individual countries. Even earlier, the European Union announced the discontinuation of the treatment of states from Morocco to Georgia in the same way, taking into account the role of neighbours, particularly Russia in the case of Ukraine, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran in the case of Egypt, and the recognition of stability and security as goals equal to democratisation and observance of the human rights (European Commission 2015). There is awareness that the introduction of democratic governance in authoritarian states carries the risk of destabilisation. Effective multilateralism has become the goal rather than the means of implementation of the strategy (Youngs 2016: p. 13).

The first part of the document lists values, which should be defended: peace and security, prosperity, democracy and the maintenance of the free market. However, less emphasis is placed on democratisation than on strengthening the resilience of countries and their readiness to cooperate with the authoritarian states in solving international problems (Shared Vision 2016). One of the instruments of influence consists of the extension, but one should not expect in the foreseeable future that the European Union would accept Turkey and Ukraine as Member States.

The European Union will respond to such threats as environmental degradation, depletion of resources, cross-border crime and terrorism. It will strive to ensure security of energy and cyberspace. While NATO remains the main organisation of collective defence, the European Union has the ambition to create a stand-alone capability (Mogherini 2016; Barigazzi 2016). This will be fostered by the development of a European armaments industry and the activities of the European Defence Agency. The Union has set itself the task to improve the gender balance through the promotion of women in efforts to ensure peace.

The new principle guiding the external action is to be principled pragmatism understood as a path between isolationism and hasty interventionism (Shared Vision 2016: p. 16; Frontini 2016). The aim is to strengthen the resilience understood as the ability of states and societies to reform themselves in order to effectively counter the crisis. Until now, in order to get certain trade privileges, neighbouring countries needed to demonstrate commitment to democratic reforms. Today, they will probably have to show progress in increasing resilience, which may be consistent with the strengthening of authoritarian regimes.

The Global Strategy states that the violation by Russia of international law, destabilising Ukraine and prolonging the frozen conflicts are an important challenge for European security. The European Union declares that it will not accept the annexation of the Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. This declaration, however, is weakened by the statement about the readiness to develop cooperation with Russia when it is in line with the interests of the parties, in particular on issues such as climate, the Arctic, education and exchange of students and entrepreneurs.

The Global Strategy assumes that national and European interests are converging. In the introduction the High Representative says that the perception of international politics as a realistic zero-sum game is wrong, because there are more possible solutions that will be beneficial to all (win-win solutions) (Mogherini 2016: 4). Critics of realistic positions, however, point out that the interests of the Member States are varied and often contradictory and that defining what is a common European interest is usually the subject of dispute.

The thesis that "fundamental values are rooted in business" is of particular concern (Shared Vision 2016). The authors of the strategy would probably like to point out that the Union will openly appeal to interests, which may lead to compromises in terms of values. However, it is possible to get the impression that it contradicts the adopted rules. Among scholars, the dominant view is that the interests should be derived from values (see: Finnemore 1996). Utilitarian and axiological spheres partially penetrate each other, but they do not fully cover. Values reflect moral norms, which allow us to judge behaviour in terms of honesty and righteousness, while interests concern benefits, require us to follow the utilitarian rules (Ziółkowski 2000: p. 57). The difference between interests and values should not be diminished; values provide criteria for evaluating foreign policy. Implementing interests contrary to values can contribute to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes that violate international law. By adopting Realpolitik the European Union may lose its moral attractiveness, which is the basis of its normative power.

The strategy does not answer the question whether the European Union's low impact on the neighbourhood was the result of excessive or insufficient value. It is hard not to see that the questioning by the majority of Member States of Serbia's territorial integrity by the recognition of Kosovo's independence gave Russia a pretext for aggression against Georgia and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Sulkowski 2015). Also the pragmatic cooperation of the EU with Russia after the aggression against Georgia in 2008, including the operation of the Nord Stream gas pipeline and in the military field, contributed to the strengthening of Russia and, consequently, aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. The European Union's foreign policy may have suffered a failure not because it was based on values, but because it had moved away from values and was focused on the pursuit of interests. From this perspective, the strategy does not set a new policy, but legalises the current one, confirming that, in the event of a conflict between values and interests, the Union will implement the latter.

It is common knowledge that European states have too divergent interests to pursue a common strategy. Large states will not delegate to EU institutions responsibility for providing their vital interests. Spain will show more concern for Morocco and Poland for Ukraine. Although Member States are part of the same Union, they have different strategic priorities and must compete for scarce resources (Jones 2016: p. 77). Different strategic cultures may be the cause of inconsistencies in EU security policy. While France is characterised by interventionist culture, the use of armed forces as an instrument for pursuing foreign policy objectives, Germany remains conservative, concentrates on rivalry in the economic sphere, does not assume the use of armed forces (Czaputowicz 2016).

The European Union must first overcome internal weaknesses before it can effectively affect the environment. Today it is more of an object than an actor, it does not spread norms or values to neighbouring countries, but it accepts refugees and migrants from them, and thus becomes dependent on the will of some of them (Leonard 2016: p. 23).

Observers point out that the European Union was different from "normal" powers such as the United States, Russia and China, which are more effective at running Realpolitik (Kortunow 2016: p. 53–54). The Global Strategy, however, points out that the EU is moving away from a value based policy complying with the logic of appropriateness for a realistic, business-based policy consistent with the logic of consequences. Moral rules will result from the perception of interests by individual states.

NATO Summit Decisions

Two weeks after the announcement of the Global Strategy, on 9 July 2016, the NATO summit took place in Warsaw. In the final communiqué, NATO recalls that it is a community of freedom, peace and security based on values such as individual freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016). To defend security and values, NATO carries out the tasks of deterrence, collective defence and crisis management.

The communiqué states that the source of the dangers can be found in Russia's efforts to reach its political goals by force. The Alliance has for years developed a partnership with Russia, also through consultative mechanisms within the NATO-Russia Council. Meanwhile, Russia has broken the rules and obligations by annexing unlawfully the Crimea, violating the boundaries of a sovereign state and destabilising eastern Ukraine. The Alliance calls on Russia to withdraw these decisions and stop aggressive actions. It expresses the fear that, as a result of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, the norm of inviolability of borders will be relativised. The Alliance has suspended civilian and military cooperation with Russia, maintaining a political dialogue aimed at avoiding misunderstandings and unintentional escalation of the conflict.

NATO stresses that an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, tied to democracy and the rule of law, is a key element to Euro-Atlantic security. It confirms strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state within the recognised borders and the right of Ukraine to decide on its future and the direction of its foreign policy. It condemns the violation of international law by Russia's actions against that state, resulting in the loss of nearly 10 000 lives. It is in favour of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the implementation of the Minsk protocol in terms of cease-fire and withdrawal of armed groups, and the reintegration of Donetsk and Lugansk regions with Ukraine. Russia is fully responsible for the deterioration of the human rights situation in the Crimea, in particular for discriminating the Crimean Tatars. Expansion of Armed Forces in Crimea threatens regional security. Russia also gave military support to the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and does not follow the spirit of the Vienna document in the field of military exercises.

NATO maintains that its partners should have the right to independent, sovereign and free of foreign pressure foreign policy choices. It is committed to strengthening the resilience to the challenges of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, and to peaceful conflict resolution in the northern Caucasus and Moldova. It promises Georgia

further training and communication support. Recognising the principle of indivisibility of security, NATO will monitor the situation in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, that is in regions of strategic importance for the Member States and partners.

In response to the dangers posed by Russia, NATO has decided to deploy four battalions on the eastern flank, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. The purpose of this step is to demonstrate solidarity and to strengthen the ability to respond immediately in the event of aggression. The headquarters of the multinational division will be located in Poland, while in Romania a multinational framework brigade will be formed to strengthen the southern part of the eastern flank. The communiqué also states that the Middle East and North Africa are a source of terrorism. In particular, the situation in Syria and Libya poses a direct threat to security. The Mediterranean operation will be transformed into a Sea Guardian operation and the area is to be observed by Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

NATO has begun discussions on the credibility of nuclear deterrence, noting the aggressive rhetoric of the Russian authorities on nuclear weapons and the need to ensure credible deterrence by US, French and British nuclear forces (see more: Czaputowicz 2012: p. 47–51). Previously, nuclear issues were silenced, as some Member States felt that tacking them could bring tension in relations with Russia. In order to maintain adequate levels of nuclear, conventional and missile forces, at least 2% of GDP is required for defence, including at least 20% for the purchase of military equipment and for research and development. After the United Kingdom had left the Union, nearly 80% of the budgetary and military resources of the Alliance will come from non-European Union members (Bilčik 2016: p. 12).

Both the Global Strategy of the European Union and the NATO Final Communiqué define threats to European security and ways to counter them. The strategy looks, in principle, to the future while the Communiqué outlines the decisions that have been already made. The strategy briefly addresses a number of issues while the communiqué is more detailed, more precisely defines the sources of threats and proposes action. The differences between the documents concern authorship, scope, principles of action, perception of threats, ways of counteracting them, cooperation with Russia and relations between the European Union and NATO (see Table 2). The reasons for these differences need to be found in the membership of both organisations, in particular in the US leadership in the Alliance.

Table 2. Comparison of the European Union strategy and NATO communiqué

	The global strategy of the European Union	NATO Final Communiqué
Authorship	High Representative, document "welcomed" by Member States	Member States that operate through their representatives
Scope	Wide, many equivalent threads	Narrow, focus on the most important threats
Principle	Principled pragmatism	Value protection, security indivisibility
Perception of threats	Degradation of the environment, depletion of resources, transnational crime and terrorism	Aggressive action by Russia striving to achieve political goals using force
Countermeasures	Increasing the resilience of states	Placing four battalion groups on the eastern flank
Cooperation with Russia	Acceptable when consistent with the interests of both parties	Suspension of cooperation, maintenance of political dialogue
EU-NATO relations	Cooperation, striving for strategic EU autonomy	Strengthening the position of Europeans within NATO

Source: own work

The above table indicates that the North Atlantic Alliance has more characteristics of normative power than the European Union. Poland traditionally refers to values in foreign policy, and is therefore closer to the position expressed in the NATO Communiqué than in the Global Strategy of the EU.

Conclusions

The global strategy announces a departure from the concept of the European Union as a normative power that promotes certain values and attracts others by its attractiveness. However, the strategy does not define a new policy, but merely confirms that in the event of a conflict between values and interests, the European Union will imple-

ment the latter. Meanwhile, interests should grow out of values that provide criteria for assessing foreign policy. By balancing interests with values, the European Union may lose its attractiveness. The final communiqué from the NATO summit in Warsaw indicates that the Alliance is beginning to play the role of a normative power. This is in line with the interests of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are in favour of a policy based on values and international law.

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