

ICERO'S 'POLITICAL PROGRAMME' IN THE *PRO ROSCIO AMERINO*

Abstract:

The speech *Pro Roscio Amerino*, delivered by Cicero in 80 BCE, is considered his *de facto* debut as an orator and an exceptionally successful one. Cicero spoke before *quaestio de sicariis et veneficiis* in defence of Roscius of Ameria, accused of patricide. Beyond its legal aspects, this speech also served as a political critique of the Sullan state, with subtle yet pointed references to Sulla himself. Employing a wide range of rhetorical devices, Cicero outlined a vision for the reform of the Republic, including calls for the restoration of the rule of law and moral renewal. In particular, he devoted significant attention to the role of the *nobilitas*, often adopting a critical tone. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of Cicero's critique of the Sullan regime and his proposed framework for the Republic's restoration as expressed in *Pro Roscio Amerino*.

Keywords:

Cicero, Sulla, Sullan state, *Pro Roscio Amerino*, Roman oratory, *nobilitas*.

In 80 BCE, Cicero delivered a speech before the tribunal established by Sulla to prosecute cases of assassination and poisoning (*quaestio de sicariis et veneficiis*¹) in defence of Sextus Roscius of Ameria (*Pro Roscio Amerino*, hereafter *PRA*), who was accused of murdering his own father (also named Sextus Roscius).² The case provoked significant emotions, as it carried not only a criminal dimension but also a political one. The murder victim's property had been seized for a symbolic sum

¹ Gruen 1968: 261–268; Ferrary 1991: 417–434.

² All dates, unless otherwise stated, are before the Common Era (BCE). All translations of the *Pro Roscio Amerino* are by J.H. Freese (*Loeb Classical Library*). For other sources, translations from the *Loeb Classical Library* were also used, with the translators specified in the respective footnotes. Adjustments have been made to some translations where necessary.

by Sulla's freedman, L. Cornelius Chrysogonus, and his accomplices. This was made possible by the proscription of Roscius the Elder, which, according to Cicero, was an act of deliberate and calculated manipulation by Chrysogonus.³ The *PRA*, however, may also be read (and, in my view, was understood that way in 80) not only as an accusation against Chrysogonus but also as a critique of the Sullan order and Sulla himself. Here, I will refer to the criticism only to the extent necessary to outline an additional argument advanced by Cicero in the *PRA*, namely his proposal for the reform of the state. Cicero articulated this proposal in direct opposition to the Sullan order, employing both explicit recommendations and rhetorical allusions. The audience must necessarily have interpreted both rhetorical strategies as a unified whole.⁴

I contend that the *PRA* is a political speech *par excellence*.⁵ Its political nature lies in Cicero's identification of the shortcomings of the Sullan state, his delineation of the field of conflict, his public criticism of the passivity and immaturity of the *nobilitas* as a socio-political class, and, finally, his presentation of a positive programme for the moral renewal of the Republic. All of this, it is carefully interwoven with the legal case of Roscius. The extensive *argumentatio* (§§ 37–142) is stretched between the detailed issues forming Cicero's defence of his client and the broader political context.

1. The case of Sextus Roscius

Sextus Roscius the Elder was the father of Sextus Roscius the Younger, who faced charges of parricide and was defended by Cicero before the *quaestio de sicariis et veneficiis* in 80. Roscius the Elder was a local notable in Ameria, a city in Umbria approximately 100 kilometres from Rome, where he owned thirteen estates (§ 20, § 99). However, he spent most of his time in the capital, attending his patrons' banquets, as he maintained extensive and influential connections within the *nobilitas* (including the Metelli, Servilii, and Scipiones – § 15). During the civil wars, Roscius supported Sulla. It is, therefore, unsurprising that after his death, Caecilia Metella offered her support and shelter to the murdered man's son (§ 147, cf. § 149). What does seem surprising, however, is that Roscius the Elder himself was

³ At the very outset of his judicial speech (§ 6), Cicero explicitly declares that Chrysogonus acted behind Sulla's back and without his knowledge (§§ 21–22, § 91, § 131).

⁴ As Powell rightly points out, the distinction between a political and a court speech is not always clear-cut. See Powell 2007: 1.

⁵ François Hinard, in his introduction to the *Les Belles Lettres* edition of the *PRA*, devotes several pages to the idea of *un discours politique* in the speech. I aim to go further in this direction. See Hinard 2006: LIII–LVII.

placed on the proscription lists, which led to the confiscation of his properties and their sale at significantly undervalued prices. According to Cicero, Roscius's name was added to the proscription lists by Chrysogonus, a freedman of Sulla (§ 21), behind the dictator's back and after the legal deadline of 1 July 82, when the proscriptions had officially closed. In Cicero's account, the confiscation of the elder Roscius's fortune was initiated by his relatives, T. Roscius Magnus and T. Roscius Capito, who persuaded Chrysogonus to include him on the proscription lists *post mortem*. Cicero accuses Magnus of commissioning the murder of Roscius. After forming the criminal *societas* (Cicero deliberately uses that term), Roscius's properties were sold, with Capito acquiring three estates and Magnus managing the remaining ten on behalf of Chrysogonus (§ 21). Meanwhile, the younger Roscius was stripped of his inheritance and accused of murdering his father, formally by C. Erucius but, in reality, at the instigation of the aforementioned *societas*.⁶

The fate of Roscius the Elder's properties after his death, combined with Cicero's astute question of *cui bono*? enabled the young lawyer not only to construct his client's defence but also to level accusations against Chrysogonus and his associates. Although this was not a formal indictment, it caused a great deal of commotion in Rome and considerable embarrassment to that part of the *nobilitas* which supported Sulla.⁷ The predicament for the *nobiles* was that, while Roscius the Elder had been an outspoken supporter of Sulla, his inclusion on the proscription lists and the appropriation of his property by Chrysogonus made every show of support for his son a possible criticism not only of Sulla's freedman but also of the dictator himself. A single gesture from Sulla indicating a willingness to sacrifice Chrysogonus would have quickly clarified matters, but all indications are that Sulla made no such move before the trial. Perhaps he was unable to do so, as Cicero's planned attack on Chrysogonus was kept secret until the day of the speech and came as a complete surprise to everyone. It was this element of surprise that gave the trial its political character and garnered wide attention.

There is no doubt in my mind that Cicero was taking a significant risk.⁸ He risked crossing not only Chrysogonus but, more importantly, Sulla, whose reaction he could not have foreseen. At the same time, he presented a pointed critique

⁶ For selected works on the Roscius case and the *PRA*, see Humbert 1925: 100–111; Kinsey 1975: 91–104; *idem* 1980: 173–190; *idem* 1985: 188–196; Vasaly 1985: 1–20; Alexander 2002: 149–172; Dyck 2003: 235–246; Berry 2004: 80–87; Craig 2010: 75–91; Zetzel 2013: 425–444.

⁷ The procedural aspects of the case of the younger Roscius are discussed in detail in Kinsey 1980: 173–190; *idem* 1985: 188–196; Alexander 2002: 150–172.

⁸ Many scholars have downplayed the risk. See Humbert 1925: 103; Gabba 1964: 10; Kinsey 1980: 173; Seager 1992: 206; Dyck 2003: 235, 246. *Contra* Badian 1958: 250; Buchheit 1975: 570; Berry 2000: 5–8; Alexander 2002: 170; Craig 2007: 267; Rosenblitt 2019: 6. Incidentally, Cicero was notably reluctant to leave Italy, which suggests other reasons for his departure in 79 than merely health concerns or rhetorical studies under Greek masters. See also Allen 1952: 233–241.

of the *nobilitas*. While most scholars believe that Cicero faced no retaliation and that his departure to Greece in 79 was in no way an enforced or self-imposed exile from Italy, it cannot be ruled out that this decision was influenced by the cumulative effect of the speeches *Pro Roscio Amerino* and *Pro Muliere Arretina*, both delivered the same year.⁹ As Alison Rosenblitt convincingly argues, the situation in Rome shifted significantly on the last day of Sulla's consulship, as his political position weakened and the general sense of danger receded.¹⁰ It should, however, be borne in mind that Cicero delivered his speech in 80, at a time when this presumed 'thaw' was only about to begin.

2. Critique of Sulla's Republic

Cicero's most serious accusation against the Sullan state concerns the unprecedented scale of violence in Rome. True, the events during the tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus and later Caius Gracchus introduced violence as a permanent feature of political life, while the events of 87 and the ruthlessness displayed by Marius towards his enemies pushed the boundaries even further. It was, however, Sulla's proscriptions that became a turning point in public perception.¹¹ Cicero never found even a shred of justification for them, although he was willing to credit Sulla with ending the civil war (§§ 136–137). The accusation of mass murder and lawlessness against Sulla's Republic can be found, among others, in §§ 80–82. Cicero cleverly put this accusation into the mouth of Erucius, while himself using a supposed quotation. Although Chrysogonus was the direct target of Cicero's frontal attack, there is no doubt that Sulla was also implicated between the lines. A similar pattern is repeated in § 127.

To Cicero, proscriptions were an immoral, criminal, and lawless procedure, particularly in the context of property confiscation. In later years, he would emphasise each of these aspects. Writing proscriptions into the law (in the face of apparent resistance from the Senate, incidentally) represented, in his view, the

⁹ While the contents of the speech *Pro muliere Arretina* are, apart from a brief fragment, unknown to us, some educated guesses are possible. It concerned the revocation of citizenship of the inhabitants of Arretium by Sulla, particularly that of the unnamed woman mentioned in the title of the speech. The defence adopted by Cicero likely included some form of criticism of the Sullan system, presumably no less pointed than that found in the *PRA*. The surviving fragment of *Pro muliere Arretina* is found in Crawford 1984: 33–34.

¹⁰ Rosenblitt 2014: 415–417.

¹¹ Hinard 1985: 103–143. For a discussion of the brutality of the proscriptions, see Hinard 2011c: 85–98.

sanctioning of lawlessness (cf. § 150),¹² a practice befitting a tyrant rather than a Roman magistrate (cf. App. *BC* 1.99; Plut. *Sulla* 30.4).¹³

The proscriptions were accompanied by the greed and insatiability of the system's apparatchiks, along with their complete lack of moral scruples.¹⁴ Cicero underscores this by comparing Chrysogonus to C. Flavius Fimbria, a near-topos of cruelty (§ 33).¹⁵ Elsewhere, he compares Chrysogonus to a robber and a pirate (§ 146),¹⁶ an epithet he would later use against Verres (*In Ver. II* 1.90) and Antonius (*Phil.* 13.18).¹⁷ At § 91, Cicero delivers a clear threat to the functionaries of Sulla's system: the *sempiterna nox* that has engulfed the Republic will not last forever; a time of reckoning will come. At the same time, Cicero absolves Sulla of personal blame, a well-considered and likely necessary strategy to shield himself from potential consequences. In this, Cicero demonstrates considerable ingenuity. By emphasising Sulla's numerous responsibilities to the state in §§ 21–22, he makes it clear that the dictator could not have known or overseen everything personally. This, however, could be interpreted as a veiled criticism, as could the justification found in § 91, which unequivocally suggests that Sulla did not have full control over what was happening in the state. The excuse at § 131, where Sulla is compared to Jupiter, is, in turn, seen by scholars as not only ironic but also deliberately impertinent.¹⁸ For this reason, I call all three defences for Sulla, which appear at more or less equal intervals in the *PRA*, an 'accusation by means of absolution'.¹⁹ The attacks on Sulla's subordinates could not be separated from Sulla himself. After all, it was he who selected these corrupt cadres and failed to exert control over them.²⁰ The paradox of justifying Sulla ultimately served to amplify Cicero's accusations against him.

¹² Cf. Gabba 1964: 12.

¹³ The word 'tyrant' is not used here in a technical sense but rather to evoke the topos of a ruthless politician, as opposed to reflecting concerns about Sulla's dynastic ambitions. It is worth noting that in later years, the epithet 'tyrant' was also applied to Cicero himself (Cic. *Pro Sulla* 22; *Pro domo sua* 94; *In Vat.* 23, 29). This term could carry a broader connotation and be applied in various contexts.

¹⁴ Cf. Thein 2017: 240–243, 249–250.

¹⁵ Zetzel 2013: 427.

¹⁶ Gladiatorial metaphors are used for Roscius Capito and Roscius Magnus (§ 17). Cf. Imholtz 1972: 228–230. For more on Cicero's use of invective, see Craig 2004: 187–213; Powell 2007: 1–23; Seager 2007: 25–46; Corbeill 2008: 198–217.

¹⁷ Cf. Opelt 1965: 134.

¹⁸ Buchheit 1975: 587–589; Berry 2004: 83.

¹⁹ In earlier scholarship, the *PRA*'s criticism of the Sullan Republic largely went unnoticed, as did Cicero's use of irony. Buchheit (1975: 575–576) references the authors of these now classic works.

²⁰ I wish to emphasise once again that my discussion concerns Cicero's narrative, not Sulla's actual capacity to enforce obedience. Sulla's responsibility for the extent of lawlessness in Rome, as depicted by Cicero, is explored in detail in Buchheit 1975: 570–591.

3. Cicero's 'political programme'

The *exordium* of the *PRA* (§§ 1–14) contains somewhat atypical elements. Cicero devotes an exceptional amount of attention to himself, which might be surprising, as one would expect an advocate to remain in his client's shadow, at least in the opening section of the speech. In §§ 1–5, Cicero focuses almost exclusively on himself, with his mention of Roscius at § 2 being merely *en passant*. At § 6, he launches an attack on Chrysogonus, and although Roscius is mentioned several times in §§ 7–14, the primary focus remains on an initial accusation against Sulla's freedman. Cicero also appeals to the judges' sense of righteousness and wisdom, directly addressing the presiding judge, M. Fannius, with a request to punish the crimes—not of Roscius, but of Chrysogonus. At the conclusion, Cicero once again emphasises the burden he bears as a *porte-parole*. In his view, this burden is twofold: not only his duty to defend Roscius but, perhaps most importantly, his obligation to the Republic.

Such a construction of the *exordium* is by no means accidental. On the contrary, it was an intricately designed foreshadowing of the speech's further development. Right from the outset, it became evident to all those present in court that the case of Roscius was not a particular matter, and his trial was not merely a defence of a young man facing severe punishment for *parricidium*.²¹ Cicero equated the plight of young Roscius with that of the Republic under threat.²² This identification was all the easier to achieve because Roscius was portrayed as yet another victim of the civil war and proscriptions, which had ultimately deprived him of his father's estate. If it is true, as Cicero emphasises, that Roscius the Elder was an ardent supporter of Sulla, then the fact that his son became a victim of the Sullan system appears all the more strikingly paradoxical.

The equation of Roscius's case with the Republic under threat from Chrysogonus and his ilk transforms the *PRA* into a *de facto* political speech, as a close reading reveals.²³ Turning the case of Roscius into a public issue was made easier by the widespread experience of the proscriptions, which affected a vast number of people, regardless of whether their own family had been directly targeted. The Roscius case brought into focus a phenomenon plainly visible to everyone: Sulla's concerted effort to replace the old elites with the new. Sulla's associates, exemplified by Chrysogonus and his ilk, embodied the worst characteristics of the new system's functionaries.

²¹ On *parricidium*, see Yan 1981: 643–715.

²² This is also mentioned in other places, e.g., § 148: (...) *summa res publica in huius periculo temptatur*.

²³ Cf. Badian 1958: 249–250; Hinard 2006: LIII–LVII. I take issue with Kinsey (1980: 189; 1982: 39–40), who denies the *PRA* any political significance.

There can be no doubt that Cicero's performance was an act of personal courage, and those who argue that he took no risk are mistaken.²⁴ Whatever protective umbrella Cicero might have been granted by certain *nobiles* within Sulla's close circle, nothing was guaranteed. Sulla's reaction to Cicero's frontal attack on Chrysogonus—and indirectly on the Sullan state as a whole—could have unleashed his fury with potentially unforeseeable consequences. Cicero's risk did not lie in the sheer likelihood of retribution but in the unpredictability of Sulla himself.

All of this can be discerned upon a close reading of the *PRA*, though certain legitimate doubts may arise. One might ask how much the speech Cicero delivered in court in 80 may have differed from the version he later published, most likely after Sulla's death. It is a question of the scope and depth of Cicero's editorial revisions. This issue is both controversial and widely debated, particularly since Jules Humbert argued in his influential work that Cicero's published speeches bore little resemblance to the original versions delivered in court.²⁵ While Humbert's thesis, in a milder formulation, continues to attract some scholars, others believe that the differences in question were not significant enough to change the general tenor of the speech.²⁶ Although a more moderate version of Humbert's thesis still finds supporters among scholars, others maintain that the differences in question were not significant enough to alter the content or tenor of the speeches. Some scholars have followed the path set by Wilfried Stroh, who considered the distinction between the delivered and published speeches as, in a sense, irrelevant, since each addressed its own autonomous audience. Stroh argued that the publication of Cicero's speeches was driven by the pragmatic need to make them accessible for study by students of rhetoric.²⁷ This entire debate has also highlighted the seemingly obvious fact that the performative nature of a speech delivered in court, even if identical to the published version, inherently made the two texts distinct entities.²⁸ There is no space

²⁴ Cf. footnote 8. Cicero himself was, unsurprisingly, inclined in later years to emphasise the risks he took in 80: (...) *adulescentes contra L. Sullae dominantis opes pro Sex. Roscio Amerino fecimus* (Cic. *De off.* 2.51).

²⁵ Humbert 1925: 100–111.

²⁶ D.H. Berry (2004: 80–87) argues in favour of significant changes in the *PRA* during its preparation for publication, although less radically than Humbert. Similarly, Gabba (1964: 10), Meier (1980: 250), and Buchheit (1975: 576) suggest modifications, at least regarding the intensification of criticism of Sulla. In contrast, Kinsey (1975: 92–95, 99–100) and Alexander (2002: 170) consider the spoken and published versions of the speech to have been identical.

²⁷ Stroh 1975: 52–53. There is no doubt that, from Cicero's perspective, the primary reason for publishing the *PRA* was to advance his political career. This is evident from the proportions of his published and unpublished speeches. In the early years of Cicero's public life, he published far more frequently than he did in later years. See Crawford 2002: 308–309.

²⁸ Stroh 1975: 54; Vasaly 1985: 19; Axer 1989: 299–311; Levene 2004: 118–119, 138–141, 146. In extreme cases, speeches may have been intended solely for reading rather than delivery. This was the case with the second *Philippic*.

here for an in-depth discussion of this issue. I would, however, side with those who believe that any changes Cicero may have made to the *PRA* before its publication were not significant.²⁹ While it is possible, as Dyck suggests, that Cicero may have sharpened certain formulations, there is little compelling evidence to suggest why he would have done so after Sulla's death. Whatever changes might have been made, they did not, in my view, alter the fundamental character or content of the speech—its critique of Sulla and the Sullan order on the one hand, and its constructive programme for state reform on the other. In any case, even when accounting for the differences in the hermeneutics of the spoken and published texts, Cicero's political manifesto as found in the *PRA* remains a valid subject of study. In this sense, the surviving version of the *PRA* is the focus of my analysis.

Right from the opening sentence of the *exordium*, Cicero draws attention to the exceptional nature of his situation, claiming that he stands before the tribunal in place of the *homines nobilissimi* to refute 'an unexampled act of villainy' (*iniuriam novo scelere conflata*), whereas they, as he asserts: 'dare not undertake the task themselves owing to the unfavourable conditions of the times' (*defendere ipsi propter iniquitatem temporum non audent*). The nobles are aware of their duty but remain silent in order to avoid danger. All they choose to do is perform the silent *officium*, which amounts to little more than their presence in court (§ 1: *ita fit ut adsint propterea quod officium sequuntur, taceant autem idcirco quia periculum vitant*).³⁰ In this situation, Cicero is ready to take up the gauntlet. He is prepared to defend Roscius regardless of the associated risk. He further states that, being young and relatively unknown, he has less to lose, since his words, however bold and potentially dangerous, will likely go unnoticed (§ 3). Of course, such posturing is mere rhetoric, as Cicero was taking no less of a risk than the *homines nobilissimi*. This was due to the freedom to speak that he had granted himself. I will set aside the frontal attack on Chrysogonus, closely tied to Cicero's defence strategy for Roscius. In terms of the political aspect, which is of interest here, Cicero critiques the lack of moral foundations underlying the Sullan state, thus indirectly criticising Sulla himself. Cicero's programme for the renewal of the state also includes a critical approach to the *nobilitas*. Noting their complicity in the Sullan order, Cicero warns that the *nobiles* must be prepared to bear the burden of reform if they are to lead it. Should they prove not ready, others will take their place (§ 140).

²⁹ These were likely changes necessary to preserve the intertextual coherence of the narrative and the clarity of the text. This may have required adding explanations about people, places, and events that were obvious to the tribunal's audience but not necessarily to the readers (assuming they were not the same individuals). On these issues, see Levene 2004: 119–146.

³⁰ Cf. § 148.

As mentioned above, the critique embedded in the *PRA* is counterbalanced by Cicero's positive programme for the Republic's renewal, though it must be immediately noted that the word 'programme' should be taken with some reservations. First, Cicero's remarks on the reform of the state neither constituted a comprehensive diagnosis nor offered an exhaustive account of the Republic's problems. Second, Cicero does not present his observations and proposals in a continuous, cohesive manner. On the contrary, they must be pieced together from numerous scattered references, remarks, and allusions throughout the *PRA*. Third, the reconstructed programme is highly allusive, often characterised by understatement, stemming from Cicero's initial assumption that the listener or reader ought to read between the lines.³¹ This arose from the need for a certain degree of caution. By 80, the Sullan regime had somewhat softened—of that, there can be no doubt.³² This did not mean, however, that caution could be entirely abandoned. Conversely, Cicero's preference for an allusive tone and political riddles was both a personal predilection and a natural extension of the rhetorical tools available to him. He never abandoned this style of speaking. Below, I will attempt to reconstruct the most important elements of the young advocate's political programme.

3.1 Rule of law

Cicero's most fundamental postulate, and his starting point, was an appeal for personal safety. As early as the *argumentatio* (§ 7), Cicero addresses Chrysogonus with a demand to be satisfied with Roscius's fortune and not threaten his life (cf. § 150). Chrysogonus here functions as a *pars pro toto*, a figure representing the archetype of the criminal (*sceler*), akin to many others who had taken advantage of the civil war and proscriptions to act unchecked under Sulla's protection. For this reason, Cicero speaks on behalf of all citizens: *Primum a Chrysogono peto, ut pecunia fortunisque nostris contentus sit, sanguinem et vitam ne petat*. This demand for personal safety, of course, underscores the oppressive nature of the times. In § 5, Cicero explicitly speaks of *iste terror* and *tanta formido*. From the perspective of 80, the scars of civil war remained painfully fresh—the proscriptions seemed to have occurred only yesterday. Their visible signs were evident not only in the mourning for the murdered but also in the forced exile of the children of the proscribed.³³

³¹ Cf. Buchheit 1975: 570–591; Rosenblit 2019: 6–7, 25.

³² This is connected to Sulla's resignation as dictator and his subsequent role as consul. I follow Badian's widely accepted view that Sulla resigned as dictator at the end of 81. See Badian 1962: 230. However, scholarly disagreement persists regarding the timing and procedure of Sulla's resignation as dictator. Vervaeke (2018: 46–69) proposes the view of '[Sulla relaxing the] dictatorship regime gradually.' An extensive bibliography on the topic can also be found there.

³³ Hinard 2011a: 99–115.

Moreover, the case of Roscius the Elder demonstrated that while mass killings had ceased, individual acts of murder persisted as everyday occurrence.

Cicero's next demand was for fair trials and proper judicial procedures. The case of Roscius provided an ideal opportunity for the Arpinate to demonstrate his understanding of what constitutes a fair trial. Its conduct and verdict were all the more significant, as Cicero himself states in § 11: 'After a long interval this is the first trial for murder that has taken place, although in the meantime there have been a large number of atrocious assassinations' (*longo intervallo iudicium inter sicarios hoc primum committitur, cum interea caedes indignissimae maximaeque factae [sint]*). This trial attracted extraordinary public interest (*quanta multitudo hominum convenit ad hoc iudicium*) and generated high expectations for severe judgments. Cicero appealed directly to the presiding judge, M. Fannius, urging him to liberate the state from open acts of criminality (*manifesta malefica*) and the daily shedding of blood (*cotidianus sanguis*). By this, Cicero referred not only to the perpetrators of Roscius the Elder's murder—namely Chrysogonus and his criminal *societas*—but to all lawbreakers of the time.

From the outset, Cicero suggested that the prosecution, its backers, and those who had profited from Roscius's death—Chrysogonus, Magnus, and Capito, along with perhaps even some members of the tribunal—had anticipated a preordained trial, where Roscius's conviction was a mere formality, and Chrysogonus and his accomplices would face no consequences. By reversing the direction of the accusations and launching a frontal attack on Chrysogonus, Cicero shattered these expectations (§ 83). The mere mention of Chrysogonus's name in § 6 electrified those present in court, especially the prosecutors. Cicero revisits this matter in greater detail in §§ 57–60, where he methodically seeks to undermine Erucius, the chief prosecutor. He emphasises Erucius's nonchalance in court, pointing out that he did not even bother to listen to Cicero's arguments—at least up to a point. The moment the name Chrysogonus was uttered, however, Erucius straightened up as if pricked by a sharp needle (§ 60):

Postea homines cursare ultro et citro non destiterunt, credo, qui Chrysogono nuntiarent, esse aliquem in civitate, qui contra voluntatem eius dicere auderet; aliter causam agi, atque ille existimaret; aperiri honorum emptionem; vexari pessime societatem; gratiam, potentiamque eius neglegi; iudices diligenter attendere; populo rem indignam videri.

After that, men continued running hastily hither and thither, I suppose to inform Chrysogonus that there was someone in Rome who was bold enough to speak contrary to his will, that the case was being carried on differently from what he expected, that the purchase of offices was revealed, that the partnership was being severely criticized and his influence and power disregarded, that the jurors were attending carefully, that the people thought the matter scandalous.

According to Cicero (§ 61), this turn of events, which he both orchestrated and executed, completely altered the dynamics of the trial. Addressing Erucius directly, Cicero states: 'you see, Erucius, that everything is changed' (*Eruci, quoniamque vides versa esse omnia*). He concludes this aside with the following remark (§ 61): *confitere huc ea spe venisse, quod putares hic latrocinium, non iudicium futurum* (admit that you have come here in the hope that you would find here the opportunity for robbery rather than a court of justice'). By contrast, Cicero declares his determination to ensure that the trial proceeds *libere*—in truth and with respect for the law. His aim is that the roles of prosecutors, defenders, and judges be performed conscientiously, with evidence evaluated objectively and thoroughly. It is no coincidence that Cicero devotes considerable space to clarifying what he understands by the diligent execution of duties by all parties involved in the trial. He does not deny prosecutors the right to present a strong and thorough accusation, provided that it is firmly grounded in evidence (§§ 55–57). In Cicero's view, however, the prosecution conducted by Erucius represents the exact opposite of how an accuser ought to act (§§ 45–55, 58–59, 72–73). The evidence presented is utterly unconvincing, and the prosecutor himself is woefully unprepared.³⁴ Cicero poses a rhetorical question to Erucius: *Quid mihi ad defendendum dedisti?* (§ 58). He sums up Erucius's entire approach as *neglegentia in accusando* (§ 59).³⁵

Cicero offers an equally meticulous account of the role of the tribunal's judges, with particular emphasis on the chairman, M. Fannius (§§ 11–12). In Cicero's perspective, the judges are entrusted with a far greater responsibility than simply delivering a just verdict. He envisions them as a crucial bulwark against injustices of the sort perpetrated by Chrysogonus and his ilk. In the absence of any action from the silent *nobiles*, the judges become Cicero's principal allies in confronting 'the iniquity of the times' (*iniquitas temporum*). They are to avert the danger not only from Roscius but also from the Republic. Cicero addresses the judges repeatedly, but the two most significant appeals are found in the *exordium* (§ 7) and at the conclusion of the *peroratio* (§§ 150–154). This is a structure typical of judicial speeches. It was not invented by Cicero.

In calling upon the judges to join him in defending the Republic, Cicero urges them to alleviate the 'suffering of the innocent' (*innocentium calamitas*) and to avert the danger threatening everyone (§ 7). He exhorts the judges to be vigi-

³⁴ It is difficult to disagree with Cicero's assertion that the evidence presented by Erucius against the younger Roscius was exceptionally weak. However, it should be noted that Erucius's speech is not extant, and its content can only be inferred from the *PRA*.

³⁵ Cicero argues that *parricidium* demands particularly meticulous and compelling evidence (§§ 68–70). For an analysis of Cicero's strategies to discredit Erucius, see Kinsey (1985: 188–196).

lant, impartial, and courageous (§ 10), while also declaring his own readiness to demonstrate courage and resolve. He states that he would rather 'groan under the weight of obligation' than succumb to cowardice stemming from disloyalty or weakness of character. Cicero sees his role as a test of his principles, one that he must face largely on his own (§ 11). Nevertheless, he counts on the judges to fulfil their role. It is their responsibility to resist the greed (*cupiditas*), crime (*scelus*), and audacity (*audacia*) of those aligned with the 'new system' (§ 12). Cicero also addresses Fannius by name, expressing his hope that the presiding judge will free the state from *manifesta malefica* and *cotidianus sanguis* (§ 11). This is not merely a personal plea. Cicero explicitly invokes the obligation placed upon the judges by the *populus Romanus* (§ 36):

ego crimen oportet diluam, vos et audaciae resistere, et hominum eius modi perniciosam atque intolerandam potentiam primo quoque tempore extinguere, atque opprimere debetis.

I have to refute the charge; it rests with you to resist audacity, to extinguish and crush the dangerous and intolerable power of men of this kind at the very first opportunity.

Cicero's expectation of courage from the judges, coupled with his pointed emphasis on the silence of the *nobiles*, placed both groups in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, the judges found it challenging to avoid choosing between participating in an independent tribunal or one that executes Sulla's will to the letter (perhaps even anticipating it, due to the chilling effect of his authority). The *nobiles*, on the other hand, were shamed by Cicero for their wait-and-see stance, if not outright cowardice. Cicero's entire judicial discourse was both a challenge to the Sullan regime and an indictment of the political elite for their inaction. It is hard to imagine a more impressive debut!³⁶

Cicero repeatedly addresses the judges, as well as Fannius by name, throughout his speech. What is at stake is not merely the case of Roscius, but the expectations placed upon the judges as participants in the political game. Cicero concludes his speech with just such a striking apostrophe (§§ 150–154), delivering a passage of remarkable rhetorical effectiveness. In § 150, he revisits his proposal for a sort of limiting condition: let Chrysogonus be satisfied with the wealth he has plundered, but let him not demand the blood of the innocent:

(...) si ille adduci non potest, ut, cum ademerit nobis omnia, quae nostra erant propria, ne lucem quoque hanc, quae communis est, eripere cupiat, si non satis habet avaritiam suam pecunia explere, nisi etiam crudelitati [sanguis praebitus] sit: unum perflugium, iudices, una spes reliqua est Sex. Roscio, eadem quae rei publicae, vestra pristina bonitas et misericordia. Quae si

³⁶ Distinctiveness is one thing; another is Cicero's meticulous preparation, both in terms of substance and rhetoric. Cicero's striving for perfection was one of the reasons for his relatively late debut, as he states quite clearly in *Brutus* (308–311).

manet, salvietiam nunc esse possumus. Sine ea crudelitas, quae hoc tempore in re publica versata est, vestras quoque animos (id quod fieri profecto non potest) duriores acerbioresque reddidit; actum est, iudices: inter feras satius est aetatem degere, quam in hac tanta immanitate versari.

(...) if after having taken away everything that belonged to us, he cannot be induced to abstain from robbing us even of the light of day which is common to all the world; if he does not consider it enough to glut his avarice with money, unless blood must also be shed to satisfy his cruelty; then, gentlemen, the only refuge, the only hope that is left for Sextus Roscius is the same that is left for the republic—the kind heartedness and compassion which you showed in earlier times. If these feelings abide, we can even now be saved. But if that barbarity, which in these times is rife in the State, hardens and embitters your hearts—which assuredly cannot be the case—then, gentlemen, it is all over; it would be better to spend one's life among wild beasts than in the midst of such frightful monsters.

That is not the only forceful rhetorical figure to end the speech. In § 153, Cicero warns the judges against initiating 'second proscriptions,' ones even worse than the first. The earlier proscriptions were a consequence of the civil war, whereas the new ones would be the deliberate choice of the judges. Those proscribed during the civil war could take up arms in their defence; now the victims would be defenceless children. By employing such rhetoric, Cicero places the judges in an untenable position, effectively making them a *sui generis* barrier against Sullan lawlessness. He concludes the speech (§ 154) with the statement that the *populus* is afflicted by *domestica crudelitas* (domestic cruelty). He implores the judges to remove this cruelty from the state and not allow it to prevail. Thus ends the speech.

3.2 Moral renewal

The attack on Chrysogonus is intertwined in the *PRA* with an attack on his accomplices, namely T. Roscius Magnus and T. Roscius Capito. The shared surname with the murder victim is far from coincidental; both Magnus and Capito hailed from Ameria and had familial ties to the elder Roscius, a connection that undoubtedly facilitated the orchestration and execution of the plot. Cicero accuses Magnus of organising the assassination in Rome (§ 84) and Chrysogonus of sabotaging the embassy sent by the people of Ameria to Sulla (§§ 25–26). This embassy was dispatched promptly after the people of Ameria learned about the elder Roscius's murder and the auctioning of his property, ostensibly justified by his supposed proscription. Cicero accuses Chrysogonus of having added Roscius to the proscription list without Sulla's knowledge and after the formal deadline for proscriptions had passed. As a result, a decree was drafted by the decurions, appointing the *decem primi*—ten distinguished citizens of Ameria—to petition Sulla for the preservation of the elder Roscius's good name. Their aim was

to have him removed from the proscription list and to prevent the confiscation of his property (§ 25, §§ 109–110). According to Cicero, the embassy first met with Chrysogonus, who dissuaded them from seeking a personal audience with Sulla by promising to handle the matter himself (§ 26, § 110). Trusting his assurances, the emissaries returned to Ameria, reassured that one of their own, T. Roscius Capito, was among the *decem primi*. However, Capito, as an accomplice of Chrysogonus and Magnus, had a vested interest in the embassy's failure. His motives became all the more apparent, as he had personally acquired three of the elder Roscius's properties at the auctions (§ 21).

The case of the embassy of the *decem primi* provided Cicero with an excellent opportunity to juxtapose the *mores maiorum* embodied by the people of Ameria with the moral degeneration represented by Chrysogonus and his *societas*. Cicero refers to the ten delegates as *homines antiqui*, which in this context can be translated as 'men of the old school' or 'old-fashioned gentlemen.' Naturally, this term, like his description of Roscius the Younger as a man of the countryside, is intended as a compliment (§§ 44–49).³⁷ In both instances, the *Amerini* embody the strict moral codes and standards of earlier times. The envoys were satisfied with Chrysogonus's word precisely because they adhered to the *mores maiorum*. They could not have anticipated that they were dealing with ruthless individuals devoid of moral principles. According to Cicero, the Republic needs the former type of men, while the latter's attitudes should be condemned and eradicated.

In the face of the lawlessness represented by Chrysogonus and his *societas*, honest citizens have only two options: they can either beg for mercy from the immortal gods and the Roman people, or appeal to the apparatchiks of the new system (§ 29). It is to the latter that Cicero now turns, addressing them as those who currently hold the supreme power (*vestramne, qui summam potentatem habetis hoc tempore*).³⁸ Naturally, this is not to be taken literally. The *summa potestas* does not belong to Chrysogonus and his ilk, but rather to Sulla—and even this is a significant oversimplification (as noted earlier, Sulla formally relinquished his dictatorial powers likely at the end of 81). There is no doubt that the *potestas* (or *potentia*) attributed to Chrysogonus is grossly exaggerated in the *PRA*. Yet, even if we take Cicero's rhetoric at face value and assume that Sulla was, in a sense, a hostage of the *improbi*, this does not absolve him of responsibility for the actions of Chrysogonus and his kind. Cicero appears to suggest that it was Sulla himself who

³⁷ Vasaly 1985: 4–13; Dyck 2003: 237–238. Naturally, Roscius's *pudor* and *modestas* were exaggerated to an extraordinary degree. Cf. footnote 39.

³⁸ Similarly, on Chrysogonus at § 6: *adulescens vel potenssimus hoc tempore*.

installed such vile creatures as Chrysogonus in positions of power.³⁹ One might wonder whether the phrase *hoc tempore* contains a veiled threat or perhaps serves as a forewarning of the impending decline of the Sullan elite's power.

The example of the Amerian embassy returns at §§ 111–113, again in the context of the necessary moral renewal. This time, Cicero is more philosophical, considering the relationships between four key concepts: *mandatum*, *officium*, *fides* and *amicitia*.⁴⁰ He points to Capito's conduct as an example of violation of the latter two. As a member of the embassy, Capito received a *mandatum* from his city's decurions. Unlike his colleagues, however, he executed the *mandatum* in bad faith. A perfect example of the violation of *officium*, it is also a violation of *fides*, and thus of *amicitia*.⁴¹ Not only friendship but also the good of the state depends on the *fides amicorum* and whoever violates it is also *oppugnat omnium commune praesidium, et, quantum in ipso est, disturbat vitae societatem* (§ 111). Cicero goes on to add:

Non enim possumus omnia per nos agere: alius in alia est re magis utilis. Idcirco amicitiae comparantur, ut commune commodum mutuis officiis gubernetur.

For we cannot do everything by ourselves: one person is more useful in one area, another in another. Therefore, friendships are established so that mutual services may sustain the common good.

Cicero is convinced that he is fulfilling the aforementioned moral imperative. In § 31, he declares that no consideration—not even fear (which clearly refers to nothing other than the Sullan regime)—is strong enough to compel him to break his *fides*. For this reason, he is prepared to defend Roscius in court, regardless of the potential consequences.

3.3 Critique of the *nobilitas*

Moral renewal is also a postulate directed at the *nobilitas*. As Cicero clearly states in § 139, if the *nobilitas* fails to meet high moral standards, it will lose power to those who uphold them. Who could potentially replace the *nobilitas*? Cicero offers a hint in the following sentences, where he criticises the faction of the *nobilitas* that openly supports Chrysogonus (§ 140). He expresses regret that some *nobiles* cannot bring themselves to accept *splendorem equestrem* while enduring the rule of a 'slave' (i.e., Chrysogonus). It would be difficult to articulate a more

³⁹ The portrayal of Chrysogonus in the *PRA* is as overdrawn as the idealised depiction of Roscius. In Chrysogonus's case, Cicero drew upon the convenient cliché of a Greek freedman, complete with the attendant stereotypes familiar from contemporary literature. For Roscius, he employed the well-worn trope of a hard-working farmer, unfamiliar with the corruption of the city and the temptations it harbours. See Dyck 2003: 237–238. On the 'masks' of Chrysogonus, Magnus, and Capito, see Vasaly 1985: 13–17.

⁴⁰ Zetzel 2013: 429–442. For further discussion on the concept of society as a contract, see *ibid.*

⁴¹ The issue of the breach of *fides* returns at § 116.

explicit call for granting a greater role to the equestrian order in the state. In § 142, Cicero states that the interests of Chrysogonus and those of the *nobilitas* are not inseparable. Those few who refuse to sever their ties with Chrysogonus will themselves be ‘separated from the splendour of power’ (*ab hoc splendore causae*). At the same time, Cicero takes care to remain tactful regarding the *nobilitas*. Those who choose to stand with Chrysogonus, he argues, should not be defeated by violence, presenting an obvious antithesis to Sulla’s *modus operandi*.

In addressing the *nobilitas*, Cicero prefers to highlight positive examples, pointing to the figure of M. Valerius Messala Niger (cos. 61) as a model worth emulating.⁴² Messala was one of the few who supported Roscius’s cause without resorting to veiled allusions. Apart from Caecilia Metella, the daughter of Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus (cos. 123), who provided Roscius with material support and shelter in Rome, and P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (cos. 53), who acted on Roscius’s behalf to advocate for the interrogation of the elder Roscius’s slaves, who were witnesses to his murder, Cicero refrains from naming other *nobiles*, likely because they chose to limit themselves to silent *officium*.⁴³ As Cicero emphasises, Messala not only stands by Roscius but also regularly defends the innocent, resists lawlessness, and is always ready to come to another’s defence whenever possible. If everyone acted as Messala did, the Republic would suffer far less from hatred.

Cicero’s final appeal to the *nobilitas* appears near the conclusion of the *PRA*. In § 150, he declares that unless Chrysogonus shows mercy to Roscius—that is, unless he contents himself with seizing Roscius’s property—the only refuge and hope left will lie in the virtues of citizens: probity (*bonitas*) and compassion (*miseri-cordia*). This applies not only to Roscius but also to the state. Should the cruelty of the proscriptions have rendered the *nobilitas* hardened and indifferent to the plight of the Republic, the fate of the state is sealed. Cicero warns that in such a scenario:

⁴² Irrespective of Cicero’s inclusion of Messala among the *homines nobilissimi*, this contemporary of Cicero was at the beginning of his *cursus honorum*. He did not hold the consulship until 61, two years after Cicero. On Messala, see *RE* 8A1, 1955, s.v. Valerius, no. 266 (Münzer). Cf. *PRA* § 149. Some scholars argue that Cicero was referring not to Niger but to his cousin, M. Valerius Messala Rufus (cos. 53). See Alexander 2002: 157. According to Dyck (2003: 236), the support for Roscius the Younger by the *nobilitas* was deliberately limited: ‘It looks as if, contrary to Cicero’s suggestion, the *homines nobilissimi* were prepared to show support for the son of a client but only to the point of sending some of their younger members as *advocati* to the court; they did not regard the case as important enough to require deeper involvement’. In Dyck’s view, this limited involvement of the *nobilitas*, combined with the absence of Roscius’s family members as defence witnesses, leads him, together with other circumstantial evidence, to conclude that Roscius was guilty of the charges against him. However, this remains a rare position among scholars.

⁴³ Erich Gruen added to the list the names explicitly mentioned by Cicero: Q. Metellus Celer (cos. 60), Q. Metellus Nepos (cos. 57), and M. Valerius Messala Rufus (cos. 53). See Gruen 1968: 214.

'it would be better to spend one's life among wild beasts than in the midst of such frightful monsters' (*inter feras satius est aetatem degere, quam in hac tanta immanitate versari*). This is a dark and forceful passage, profoundly Hobbesian in its tone. It is no coincidence that it forms part of the speech's conclusion.

The moral postulates directed at the *nobilitas* are a striking feature of the *PRA*. Yet, beyond its ethical appeals, the speech had its own pragmatic dimension as well. Ernst Badian wrote that the *PRA* held 'extreme importance for the whole *nobilitas*':

The point at issue was nothing less than whether the *nobiles* could maintain their influence in the Italian countryside, or whether the Italians—the new voters and legionaries—should be encouraged to follow any upstart—even a freedman—who acquired sufficient *potentia*.⁴⁴

According to Badian, Cicero's success in securing the acquittal of Roscius was supposed to benefit the entire *nobilitas*:

The *nobiles*, in a striking example, had vindicated their *fides* and their power to protect their clients. The case of Sex. Roscius was the *coup de théâtre* that alone could restore their prestige and influence in Italy after the shocks of Social War, Civil War and military dictatorship.⁴⁵

It is a gross exaggeration, however, to equate Roscius's acquittal and Cicero's personal triumph with a broader success for the *nobilitas* as a ruling class. In this matter, Badian attributes disproportionate significance to the *PRA*. In my view, it is also misguided to regard Cicero as a 'hired agent' of the *nobilitas*. In fact, Cicero positions himself as standing somewhat apart while also pointing to the ambitions of the municipal elites—ambitions he not only refrains from condemning but appears to support. At this stage of his career, Cicero was likely more inclined towards the idea of expanding the traditional ruling class rather than maintaining the existing *status quo*.⁴⁶

3.4 An alternative model of the state

The Ciceronian programme of state renewal was largely built on the rejection of the practices of the Sullan state. I emphasise 'practices' because Cicero's stance towards Sulla's constitutional reforms was far more nuanced than simple affirmation or rejection. This is especially evident when one analyses Cicero's later statements scattered throughout his writings. These later reflections do not necessarily align with what Cicero thought in 80. Even within the *PRA* itself, one can

⁴⁴ Badian 1958: 250.

⁴⁵ Badian 1958: 251.

⁴⁶ In that sense, it was the logical result of the reforming efforts of M. Livius Drusus, but also of Sulla himself. Cf. Gabba 1964: 1–10.

discern Cicero's complex attitude toward Sulla and his reforms. I set aside here the three occasions on which Cicero absolves Sulla of the system's 'deviations' (§§ 21–22, 91, 131). These statements served as Cicero's insurance policy, and it is understandable why he employed them. That said, Cicero's critique of the Sullan order (whether explicit or allusive) in the *PRA* is thorough. Yet thorough does not mean total. Cicero's critique is primarily a criticism of application, focusing on the methods employed.⁴⁷ This includes his call for the rejection of state violence, his disapproval of Sulla's choice of means and personnel, his condemnation of the violation of traditional values and methods of conflict resolution, and his criticism of the assault on private property. Of course, Sulla was far from the first to introduce violence into Roman political life. It had become a constant in Roman politics since at least the time of the Gracchi.⁴⁸ The tribunates of Tiberius and Gaius and the accompanying events significantly exacerbated political polarisation. Cicero consistently regarded civil war as the true calamity of the Republic. For this reason, in the *PRA*, he expresses gratitude to Sulla for ending the war, framing it rhetorically as 'saving dignity' (§ 137). Cicero never lost sight of the fact that it was Marius who initiated the war in 88, and he may have been somewhat sincere when he said (§ 136):

Sciunt ii, qui me norunt, me pro mea tenui infirmaque parte, posteaquam id, quod maxime volui, fieri non potuit, ut componeretur, id maxime defendisse, ut ii vincerent, qui vicerunt.

Those who know me are aware that, to the best of my poor and feeble abilities, from the moment it became impossible to achieve what I most desired—namely, that a reconciliation should take place—I earnestly strove to support the side that emerged victorious.⁴⁹

It is reasonable to believe that, in the face of the civil war, Cicero chose the faction that was ideologically closer to him. Obviously, this alignment, however, did not signify unconditional support for the Sullan faction. The assertion that *dignitas* triumphed over *humilitas* belongs to the realm of rhetoric, as does the statement: *Quo in certamine perdit civis erat, non se ad eos iungere, quibus incolumibus et domi dignitas et foris auctoritas retineretur* ('In such a contest it would have been the act of a degenerate citizen not to join those whose safety assured the dignity

⁴⁷ Years later, Cicero would say in *De officiis* (2.27): 'In Sulla's case, therefore, an unrighteous victory disgraced a righteous cause' (*Ergo in illo [i.e. in Sulla] secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria*). Cf. Mitchell 1979: 65–66, 90–91.

⁴⁸ Even that is a conventional caesura, as violence had been a constant feature of Roman politics from the very outset. See Lintott 1968; Riess, Fagan (eds) 2016; Lange 2018: 165–189.

⁴⁹ Cicero was aware of certain similarities between himself and Marius (both were *homines novi* and both hailed from Arpinum), which at first glance might suggest some degree of solidarity with him. However, Cicero's overall assessment of Marius was highly critical. While he appreciated Marius's military prowess, he consistently condemned his domestic policies. See Mitchell 1979: 46–51.

of the state at home and its authority abroad'—§ 136). While Cicero was grateful to Sulla for ending the fratricidal civil war and likely for the moderate normalisation of relations in 81 and 80, he never accepted the violence and lawlessness of the preceding years, 83 and 82.⁵⁰ Their lasting consequence was Sulla's seizure of power and the plundering of confiscated properties from the proscribed. These properties were taken over by the 'most vile of men' (*homines postremit*). In the *PRA*, Cicero states that there is no way to counteract these injustices or even to criticise them verbally (§ 137). Violating private property rights without due process would later become one of Cicero's lasting reproaches against Sulla, as reflected, among other works, in his *De officiis* (1.43, 2.27, 2.29).

In his later writings, Cicero would expand the negative image of Sulla by incorporating additional elements, pointing to the dictator's dysfunctional *psyche*. He would highlight Sulla's lack of self-restraint, his tendency for violent outbursts, and his proclivity for rage, thereby solidifying the Sullan topos of the tyrant (Cic. *De leg. agr.* III 5). Over time, this focus on Sulla's psychological traits would become a recurring theme in nearly all subsequent references to the dictator in later decades and centuries. Plutarch of Chaeronea would even undertake a rather ambitious analysis of the dictator's *psyche*.⁵¹

4. Conclusion

I have already had occasion to make the caveat that the term Cicero's 'political programme' should be understood in a figurative sense. Antiquity knew neither political programmes nor parties in the modern sense. Of course, the differences do not end there. Cicero's proposals in the *PRA* were part of a public performance (and later its published version), which relied on persuasion achieved through rhetorical tools.⁵² This inherently involved a certain degree of exaggeration, playing appeals to emotions, and the use of various eristic devices.⁵³ These methods were characteristic not only of judicial speeches but also of political oratory. Naturally, the *PRA* also included an immediate objective: securing Roscius's acquittal on

⁵⁰ In later years, he would also praise Sulla for radically limiting the plebeian tribunes' influence on politics (*De leg.* 3.22), a reform that ultimately proved unsustainable. See Rosenblitt 2014: 415–444; Burton 2014, 404–421. Nor did Cicero ever question Sulla's exceptional military talents (*Pro Mur.* 32).

⁵¹ Plut. *Sulla*.

⁵² Cf. Solmsen 1938: 542–556; Vasaly 1985: 1–20; Craig 2010: 75–91.

⁵³ On the theatrical aspect of oratory, see Vasaly 1985: 1–3; Axer 1989: 299–311; Harries 2007: 129–147. According to Harries, Cicero experimented with various techniques borrowed from actors from the very outset of his career as a lawyer, presumably aided by his close connections to theatrical circles. See Axer 1989: 305–307; Harries 2007: 131–132. See also Hall 2014: *passim*.

parricide charges. Thanks to the masterful composition of the speech, these two dimensions—the broader political one and the narrower focus on defending the client—intertwined seamlessly into a coherent whole.

Roscus's acquittal was a significant victory for his advocate, marking a turning point in Cicero's legal career. The defence of Roscius elicited such widespread admiration that Cicero never again had cause to complain about a lack of clients (Cic. *Brut.* 311). Equally important was the political impact of the *PRA*. The verdict could be interpreted as a promise of state renewal through the clearly articulated demand for a return to the rule of law. The fact that Roscius was acquitted while Chrysogonus and his *societas* were accused (even if not formally, then politically) and that Sulla made no effort to defend them gave hope that justice and the rule of law were being restored and that the *questiones* were once again functioning as they had in earlier times.⁵⁴ It was a win-win for both Cicero and Sulla.

Another postulate raised in the *PRA*, though not as straightforward to implement, immediately entered the political discourse. This was the pressing question of the status of the proscribed individuals who had survived and were living in exile, as well as their children.⁵⁵ The central issue revolved around their return from exile and the potential restitution of confiscated properties. While such demands may have seemed premature during Sulla's lifetime, a sequence of events—including his resignation from the dictatorship in 81,⁵⁶ the end of his consulship the following year, and his subsequent withdrawal from Rome—created the opportunity to address these matters more openly. Cicero explicitly advocated for the return of the proscribed and their children, though he addressed the issue property restitution in a more oblique manner.

The *PRA* represents the earliest known instance of a polemic addressing the issue of the proscribed and their descendants. François Hinard argues that this matter had always been central to political debate, as evidenced by the ease with which Cicero alluded to it.⁵⁷ Cicero presumably resonated with the sentiments of a portion of the *nobilitas*, as demonstrated by the support given to M. Aemilius

⁵⁴ It appears that Sulla wrote Chrysogonus off. We hear nothing of him after the Roscius trial. See Hinard 2011b: 204–205.

⁵⁵ For the prosopography of the *liberi proscriptorum*, see Hinard 2011a: 102–110. Due to the limitations of our sources, Hinard's list remains highly incomplete.

⁵⁶ Cf. footnote 32.

⁵⁷ Hinard 2011a, 99. Berry (2004: 84–86) takes a different view, arguing that the references to the *liberi proscriptorum* were later interpolations added by Cicero after Sulla's death and were not part of the speech delivered in court. I side with Hinard.

Lepidus in 79, who made the issue of the proscribed the cornerstone of his campaign for the consulship of the following year.⁵⁸

It is all the more strikingly ironic that, many years later, in the year of his consulship, Cicero opposed the heirs of the proscribed, whose status remained unresolved. In 63, he delivered the speech *De proscriptorum liberis*, in which he quite openly sacrificed the interests of this group on the altar of contemporary political manoeuvring—a fact that Cicero acknowledged with striking candour (*In Pison.* 2.4):

Ego adolescentis bonos et fortis, sed usos ea condicione fortunae ut, si essent magistratus adepti, rei publicae statum convolsuri viderentur, meis inimicitiiis, nulla senatus mala gratia comitorum ratione privavi.

I deprived, through my own enmity but without any disapproval from the senate, certain brave and upright young men—whose experience of misfortune was such that, had they obtained office, they seemed likely to overthrow the state—of the opportunity to stand for election.⁵⁹

Cicero's calculated approach (according to some) or his pragmatism (according to others) in 63 does not, however, determine his motivations in 80. During Sulla's time in power, Cicero was at a very different stage of his career, and it is quite plausible that, although lacking any significant political position at the time, he acted with greater freedom and in closer accordance with his own system of values. François Hinard argues that Cicero's idealism stemmed from his philosophical education, which played a formative role in shaping his outlook.⁶⁰ Over time, Cicero learned the art of political pragmatism, a quality that often invited criticism. Quintilian clearly indicated that Cicero's attitude toward the Sullan state, while generally critical, included certain affirmative elements. Depending on the immediate needs of the moment, Cicero was adept at selecting what was useful

⁵⁸ It was important to him not only for family reasons (his adopted son L. Cornelius Scipio Asiagenus was probably proscribed) but also because the issue itself resonated widely and, at least in certain circles, increased Lepidus's chances of election. See Hinard 2011a: 100; Rosenblitt 2014: 417–427.

⁵⁹ Translation by N.H. Watts (*Loeb Classical Library*). Cicero's cynicism and calculated self-interest did not escape the notice of others either. As Quintilian observed (*IO* 11.[1].85): *Quid enim crudelius quam homines honestis parentibus ac maioribus natos a re publica summoueri? Itaque durum id esse summus ille tractandorum animorum artifex confitetur, sed ita legibus Sullae cohaerere statum ciuitatis adfirmat ut iis solutis stare ipsa non possit. Consecutus itaque est ut aliquid eorum quoque causa uideretur facere contra quos diceret* ('What could be more cruel than that the offspring of honourable parents and ancestors should be banned from public life? For this reason, that great master of the manipulation of minds admits that this is hard, but says that the constitution is so closely bound up with the laws of Sulla that it could not survive their repeal. He thus succeeded in seeming to do something to help even those against whom he was speaking'. Translation by D.A. Russell [*Loeb Classical Library*]). Quintilian captured the matter with remarkable accuracy, though he understood Cicero's motivations and sought to absolve him.

⁶⁰ Hinard 2006: LXXI.

to him.⁶¹ Given the realities of political life in the first century, one should be cautious about reproaching him too harshly for this. Over time, Sulla and the Sullan state became tools in Cicero's rhetorical repertoire, to be invoked whenever circumstances demanded.⁶²

In light of the above, the political dimension of the *PRA* appears clearly discernible. It is worth noting, in conclusion, that the *PRA* contains, in an embryonic form, certain motifs that Cicero would later develop in his career, sometimes in a spectacular manner. Chief among these is the figure of the saviour of the Republic. This concept emerged no later than Cicero's consulship, with the first attempts at giving it formal expression dating to December 63 and early 62.⁶³ It was then that Q. Lutatius Catulus Capitolinus (cos. 78) proposed in the Senate that Cicero be declared *parens patrie* (Cic. *In Pis.* 6: *Me Q. Catulus, princeps huius ordinis et auctor publici consili, frequentissimo senatu parentem patriae nominavit*).⁶⁴ Cicero skilfully capitalised on such endorsements. The concept of the saviour of the Republic was already well established in the speeches delivered against Catiline. The version we know today, edited and revised by Cicero himself, was most likely published in 60 (Cic. *Att.* 2.1.3). Two key components of Cicero's self-presentation in these speeches are his emphasis on saving the state without resorting to civil war and bloodshed, and his insistent claim that he accomplished this as consul entirely on his own. It seems to me that prefigurations of both roles Cicero would later assign to himself can already be detected in the *PRA*. There, Cicero states that he defended Roscius alone (*relictus ex omnibus*, § 5). In the future, he would repeatedly position himself as a politician acting single-handedly (for example, in Cic. *In Pis.* 6: *iuravi rem publicam atque hanc urbem mea unius opera esse salvam*). The second element seems even more significant: the renunciation of violence or even its out-

⁶¹ When it came to discrediting Rullus's project, Cicero labelled him a Sullan. On another occasion, however, when the optimate cause required it, he defended P. Cornelius Sulla, the dictator's nephew and thus a Sullan by blood, the very same man he would later accuse of profiting from the properties of the proscribed (Cic. *De off.* 2.8). Cf. Kumaniecki 1959: 224–226. For Cicero's later assessment of Sulla, see Buchheit 1975: 571–574.

⁶² Regardless, a process that we might describe as the solidification of Sulla's legend was underway. Scholars debate the details of its course, but there is no doubt that it began immediately after the dictator's death. The literature on the formation of Sulla's legend is extensive and presents a wide array of proposed reconstructions. Selected works include: Laffi 1977a: 177–213, Laffi 1977b: 255–277; Hinard 1984: 81–97; Ramage 1991: 93–121; Barden-Dawling 2000: 303–340; Eckert 2015: 262–274; Miączewska 2013: 191–212; Eckert 2018: 283–298.

⁶³ The concept is discussed thoroughly in Berdowski 2024.

⁶⁴ Cf. Cic. *Att.* 9.10.3; see Kaster 2006: 353–354. Plutarch (*Cic.* 23.2–3) suggests that the calls to proclaim Cicero as saviour (σωτήρ) and restorer (κρίστης) of the Republic were a widespread, grassroots initiative. Regardless, we can confidently assume that it was never formalised. Otherwise, Cicero would not have missed the opportunity to boast of such an honour in his speeches and letters.

right condemnation. This is accompanied by the conviction, expressed more or less explicitly in the *PRA*, that the speaker's voice can serve as a weapon just as effective as physical arms.

It is no secret that Cicero never saw himself as a conqueror celebrating his military victories. He was acutely aware of his own personal predispositions and limitations. The clash of arms was no music to his ears, and the path taken by Marius, Sulla, or Pompeius was not one he chose to follow.⁶⁵ The problem was that the traditional standard required a politician to include military achievements as an integral part of his political career. Conquests, spoils of war, imperatorial acclamations—all of these mattered at least as much as skill in political intrigue and the ability to form strategic alliances. From the very beginning, Cicero was compelled to seek an alternative path, one he found in the seemingly paradoxical formula of a *dux et imperator togatus*, as articulated in his speeches against Catilina.⁶⁶

The speech delivered on the 3 of December 63 in the Forum Romanum saw Cicero explain that, while his victory involved no bloodshed, it was in no way inferior to one achieved on the battlefield (Cic. *In Cat.* 3.23):

*Erepti enim estis ex crudelissimo ac miserrimo interitu, erepti sine caede, sine sanguine, sine exercitu, sine dimicatione; togati me uno togato duce et imperatore vicistis.*⁶⁷

You have been rescued from the cruellest and most pitiable of calamities; you have been rescued without slaughter, without bloodshed, without an army, and without fighting. It was I alone, I, clad in the toga, commander and imperator, who brought you victory.⁶⁸

A similar motif appears in Cicero's epic poem *De consulatu suo*, written no later than March 60 (Cic. *Att.* 1.19.10).⁶⁹ The poem contains the famous line: *cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi* (fr. 6 ap. Cic. *In Pis.* 74). Although the poem has survived only in fragments, and the context of this particular phrase is missing,

⁶⁵ As May (2002: 2) rightly observes: 'While others might appeal to the loyalty of their legions and play power politics backed by the force of arms, Cicero could wield only the weapon of his words.'

⁶⁶ The phrases cited here resonate with Cicero's statement in *De oratore* 1.128: *nihil in hominum genere rarius perfecto oratore inveniri potest. On dux et imperator togatus*, see Hall 2013: 215–229; Berdowski 2024: 301–342.

⁶⁷ He expressed a similar view in *In Cat.* 2.28: *Atque haec omnia sic agentur, Quirites, ut maximae res minimo motu, pericula summa nullo tumultu, bellum intestinum ac dome sticum post hominum memoriam crudelissimum et maximum me uno togato duce et imperatore sedetur* ('In all these measures I shall ensure that a major crisis is resolved with the least disturbance, that acute dangers are averted without a state of emergency, and that the most bitter and widespread civil war within the memory of man is suppressed with a single civil magistrate as your general to lead you.' Translation by C. MacDonald).

⁶⁸ Translation by C. MacDonald (*Loeb Classical Library*).

⁶⁹ On the poem, see Volk 2013: 93–112; Volk, Zetzel 2015: 204–223.

there is no doubt that this type of phraseology, akin to that found in the speeches against Catilina, is present there as well.⁷⁰

It is open to debate whether the concept of a toga-clad general, who commands not legions but the power of words, emerged in Cicero's mind as early as 80, and whether his subsequent actions were a consistent attempt to realise this vision. What can be stated with certainty, however, is that the *PRA* contains clear foreshadowings of Cicero's later reflections on the state, its elites, the values he championed, and his own role in politics. In this sense, the *PRA* should be recognised not only as an exceptionally successful debut of a young lawyer but also as a mature political declaration from a budding statesman.

Bibliography

- Alexander, M.C. 2002: *The case for the prosecution in the Ciceronian era*, Ann Arbor.
- Allen, W. 1952: 'Cicero's Provincial Governorship in 63 B.C.', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 83, 233–241.
- Axer, J. 1989: 'Tribunal-Stage-Arena: Modelling of the Communication Situation in M. Tullius Cicero's Judicial Speeches', *Rhetorica. A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 7, 299–311.
- Badian, E. 1958: *Foreign clientelae (264–70 B.C.)*, Oxford.
- Badian, E. 1962: 'From the Gracchi to Sulla (140–59)', *Historia* 11, 197–245.
- Barden Dowling, M. 2000: 'The clemency of Sulla', *Historia* 49, 303–340.
- Batstone, W.W. 1994: 'Cicero's Construction of Consular Ethos in the First Catilinarian', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 124, 211–266.
- Berdowski, P. 2024: 'Głos w obronie cycerońskiej narracji o wybawcy republiki' ['A voice defending the Ciceronian narrative as the saviour of the Republic'], *Przegląd Historyczny*, 115, 301–342.
- Bernard, E. (ed.) 2011: *Rome, la dernière République. Recueil d'articles de François Hinard* (Ausonius Éditions. Scripta Antiqua, 32), Bordeaux.
- Berry, D.H. 2004: 'The Publication of Cicero's Pro Roscio Amerino', *Mnemosyne* 57, 80–87.
- Berry, D.H. 2000: *Cicero, Defence speeches. Translated with introductions and notes by D.H. Berry* (Oxford World's Classics), Oxford, New York.
- Booth, J. (ed.) 2007: *Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond*, Oxford.
- Buchheit, V. 1975: 'Ciceros Kritik an Sulla in der Rede für Roscius aus Ameria', *Historia* 24, 570–591.

⁷⁰ Later, Cicero modified the idea slightly, asserting that he had saved the Republic not once but twice: *unus rem publicam bis servavi* (Cic. *Pro Sest.* 49). The second instance, according to him, was his voluntary exile, which allegedly spared the Republic from another civil war.

- Burton, P. 2014: The Revolt of Lepidus (cos. 78 BC) Revisited, *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 63, 404–421.
- Corbeill, A. 2002: 'Ciceronian invective', in May, J.M. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden, Boston, 198–217.
- Craig, C. 2004: 'Audience Expectations, Invective, and Proof', in Powell, J., Paterson J. (eds), *Cicero the Advocate*, Oxford, 187–213.
- Craig, C. 2007: 'Cicero as orator', in Dominik, W.J., Hall, J. (ed.), *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, Malden Mass., 264–284.
- Craig, C. 2010: 'Means and ends of indignatio in Cicero's *Pro Roscio Amerino*', in Berry, D.H., Erskine, A. (eds), *Form and function in Roman oratory*, Cambridge, 75–91.
- Crawford, J. 2002: 'The lost and fragmentary orations', in May, J.M. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden, Boston, 305–330.
- Crawford, J.W. 1984: *M. Tullius Cicero: the lost and unpublished orations* (Hypomnemata: Untersuchungen zur Antike und ihrem Nachleben, Heft 80), Göttingen.
- Dugan, J.R. 2005: *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*, Oxford.
- Dyck, A.R. 2003: 'Evidence and Rhetoric in Cicero's *Pro Roscio Amerino*: The Case Against Sex. Roscius', *The Classical Quarterly (New Series)* 53, 235–246.
- Eckert, A. 2015: 'Remembering Cultural Trauma: Sulla's Proscriptions, Roman Responses, and Christian Perspectives', in Becker, E.-M., Dochhorn, J., Holt, E. (eds), *Trauma and Traumatization in Individual and Collective Dimensions*, Göttingen, 262–274.
- Eckert, A. 2018: 'Good fortune and the public good: Disputing Sulla's claim to be Felix', in van der Blom, H., Gray, C., Steel, C. (eds), *Institutions and ideology in Republican Rome: Speech, audience and decision*, Cambridge, 283–298.
- Ferrary, J.-L. 1991: 'Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis', *Athenaeum* 79, 417–434.
- Gabba, E. 1964: 'M. Livio Druso e le riforme di Silla', *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Lettere, Storia e Filosofia* 33, 1–15.
- Gruen, E.S. 1968: *Roman politics and the criminal courts, 149–78 B.C.*, Cambridge, Mass.
- Hall, J. 2013: 'Saviour of the Republic and Father of the Fatherland: Cicero and political crisis', in Steel, C. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, Cambridge, 215–230.
- Hall, J. 2014: *Cicero's Use of Judicial Theater*, Ann Arbor.
- Harries, B. 2007: 'Acting the part: techniques of the comic stage in Cicero's early speeches', in Booth, J. (es.), *Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond*, Oxford, 129–147.
- Hinard, F. 1984: 'La naissance du mythe de Sylla', *Revue des Études Latines* 62, 81–97.
- Hinard, F. 1985: *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine* (Collection de l'École française de Rome, 83), Roma.
- Hinard, F. 2006: 'Notice', in *Cicéron, Discours. Tome I–2e partie. Pour Sextus Roscius*. Texte établi, trad. et commenté par François Hinard, notes de Yasmina Benferhat (Collection des universités de France Série latine, 384), Paris, VII–CVII.

- Hinard, F. 2011a: 'Sur les *liberi proscripctorum*. Approches prosopographique et juridique d'un problème politique', in Bernard, E. (ed.), *Rome, la dernière République. Recueil d'articles de François Hinard* (Ausonius Éditions. Scripta Antiqua, 32), Bordeaux, 99–115.
- Hinard, F. 2011b: 'L. Cornelius Chrysogonus et la portée politique du pro Roscio Amerino', in Bernard, E. (ed.), *Rome, la dernière République. Recueil d'articles de François Hinard* (Ausonius Éditions. Scripta Antiqua, 32), Bordeaux, 203–205.
- Hinard, F. 2011c: 'La male mort. Exécutions et statut du corps au moment de la première proscription', in Bernard, E. (ed.), *Rome, la dernière République. Recueil d'articles de François Hinard* (Ausonius Éditions. Scripta Antiqua, 32), Bordeaux, 85–98.
- Humbert, J. 1925: *Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de Cicéron*, Paris.
- Imholtz, A.A. 1972: 'Gladiatorial Metaphors in Cicero's "Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino"', *The Classical World* 65, 228–230.
- Kaster, R.A. 2006: *Cicero. Speech on behalf of Publius Sestius* (Clarendon Ancient History Series), Oxford, New York.
- Kinsey, T.E. 1980: 'Cicero's Case against Magnus Capito and Chrysogonus in the Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino and its Use for the Historian', *L'Antiquité Classique* 49, 173–190.
- Kinsey, T.E. 1982: 'The political insignificance of Cicero's *Pro Roscio*', *Liverpool Classical Monthly* 7, 39–40.
- Kinsey, T.E. 1985: 'The Case against Sextus Roscius of Ameria', *L'Antiquité Classique* 54, 188–196.
- Kinsey, T.E. 1975: 'Cicero's speech for Roscius of Ameria', *Symbolae Osloenses* 50, 91–104.
- Kumaniecki, K. 1959: *Cyceron i jego współcześni* [*Cicero and his contemporaries*], Warszawa.
- Laffi, U. 1967a: 'Il mito di Silla. Parte I', *Athenaeum* 45, 177–213.
- Laffi, U. 1967b: 'Il mito di Silla. Parte II', *Athenaeum* 45, 255–277.
- Lange, C.H. 2018: 'Cassius Dio on Violence, Stasis, and Civil War: the Early Years', in Burden-Strevens C., Lindholmer M.O. (eds), *Cassius Dio's Forgotten History of Early Rome* (Historiography of Rome and Its Empire Series, 3), Leiden, 165–189.
- Levene, D.S. 2004: 'Reading Cicero's Narratives', in Powell, J., Paterson J. (eds), *Cicero the Advocate*, Oxford, 117–146.
- Lintott, A.W. 1968: *Violence in Republican Rome*, Oxford.
- May, J.M. 2002: *Cicero: his life and career*, in May, J.M. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden, Boston, 1–21.
- May, J.M. (ed.) 2002: *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, Leiden, Boston.
- Meier, C. 1980: *Res publica amissa: eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik*, Frankfurt am Main.
- Miączewska, A.B. 2013: 'Good General Becoming Evil Tyrant: the Deconstruction of the Sullan Topos', in Słapek, D., Łuć, I. (eds), *Lucius Cornelius Sulla: history and tradition*, Lublin, 191–212.
- Mitchell, T.N. 1979: *Cicero, the ascending years*, New Haven.

- Opelt, I. 1965: *Die lateinische Schimpfwörter und verwandte sprachliche Erscheinungen*, Heidelberg.
- Powell, J.G.F. 2007: 'Invective and the orator: Ciceronian theory and practice', in Booth, J. (eds), *Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond*, Oxford, 1–23.
- Ramage, E.S. 1991: 'Sulla's Propaganda', *Klio* 73, 93–121.
- Riess, W., Fagan, G.G. (eds) 2016: *The topography of violence in the Greco-Roman world*, Ann Arbor.
- Rosenblitt, J.A. 2014: 'The Turning Tide: The Politics of the Year 79 B.C.E.', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 144, 415–444.
- Rosenblitt, J.A. 2019: *Rome after Sulla*, London.
- Seager, R. 2007: 'Ciceronian invective: thames and variations', in Booth, J. (ed.), *Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond*, Oxford, 25–46.
- Solmsen, F. 1938: 'Cicero's First Speeches: A Rhetorical Analysis', *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 69, 542–556.
- Steel, C. 2013: 'Cicero, oratory and public life', in Steel, C. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, Cambridge, 160–170.
- Steel, C. (eds) 2013: *The Cambridge Companion to Cicero*, Cambridge.
- Stroh, W. 1975: *Taxis und Taktik: Die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden*, Stuttgart.
- Thein, A. 2017: 'Percussores: a study in Sullan violence', *Tyche* 32, 235–250.
- Vasaly, A. 1985: 'The Masks of Rhetoric: Cicero's *Pro Roscio Amerino*', *Rhetorica. A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 3, 1–20.
- Vervaeke, F.J. 2018: 'The Date, Modalities and Legacy of Sulla's Abdication of his Dictatorship: a Study in Sullan Statecraft', *Studia Historica: Historia Antiqua* 36, 31–82.
- Volk, K. 2013: 'The Genre of Cicero's *De consulatu suo*', in Papangelis, T.D., Harrison, S.J., Frangoulidis, S.A. (eds), *Generic interfaces in Latin literature: encounters, interactions and transformations*, Berlin, Boston, 93–112.
- Volk, K., Zetzel, J.E.G. 2015: 'Laurel, tongue and glory (Cicero, *De consvlatu suo* fr. 6 Soubiran)', *The Classical Quarterly* 65, 204–223.
- Wiseman, T.P. 1971: *New men in the Roman senate, 139 B.C. – A.D. 14*, London.
- Yan, T. 1981: 'Parricidium', *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome. Antiquité* 93, 643–715.
- Zetzel, J.E.G. 2013: 'A Contract on Ameria: Law and Legality in Cicero's "Pro Roscio Amerino"', *The American Journal of Philology* 134, 425–444.

Piotr Berdowski

pberdowski@ur.edu.pl

Institute of History
University of Rzeszów
Rejtana 16C
35-959 Rzeszów, Poland

